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Abstract
Most personal computers today employ knowl-
edge based user authentication e.g. password pro-
tection. Nevertheless, password protection is re-
garded as insecure. This paper investigates if
a token based authentication solution for Win-
dows XP (using passive USB storage devices), can
counter any of the documented issues inherent
with password based authentication. An architec-
ture for such a solution aimed at the home/small
business market is presented and evaluated.
The research method is based on the principles
of Design Research. The achitecture and proto-
type is developed using prototyping. A litterature
study provides a theoretical framework used as a
basis for architecture evalutation. This paper’s
contribution is mainly an architecture of a token
based authentication solution (for Windows XP),
capable of addressing many of the known prob-
lems regarding password use. Conclusions include
the observed pros and cons of the suggested solu-
tion, as well as recommendations regarding areas
of improvement and future research.
Keywords user authentication, token, pass-
word alternatives
1 Introduction
This paper presents and evaluates a prototype ar-
chitecture for a token based authentication solu-
tion. The architecture is evaluated against find-
ings from a literature study, and empirical findings
from prototype development.
The research question is: In the context of home
or small business environments, can a token based
authentication solution, using passive USB tokens,
counter existing, or introduce new issues, com-
pared other authentication methods described and
categorized in available literature?
The literature study investigates the user accep-
tance and efficiency of the three groups of authen-
tication methods. (When used for user authenti-
cation and not user identification. E.g. to verify
an identity claimed by a user, not to identify a
user.) The paper will in part discuss applications
of these methods in e-banking, large scale corpo-
rate environments and alike. However, only when
the authors feel such analysis will help them in
the drawing conclusions regarding what would be
a suitable alternative for the home/small business
market. The scope of this paper will not permit
a complete review of available published material
but is limited to a mere subset.
The prototype serves as a means of investigat-
ing the Win XP applicability, and as a facilitator
of empirical findings.
1.1 Background
Much of your information stored on information
systems, such as private files on your PC or con-
versations on your e-mail is meant to be for your
eyes only. In order to keep them that way, most of
these systems employ some form of user authen-
tication. User authentication is of the essence in
order to ensure that only allowed users access an
information system. Authentication methods are
most often evaluated in terms of effectiveness (i.e.
ability to reject unauthorized and accept autho-
rized users), cost and user acceptance(i.e. to what
degree the users find the method acceptable).
Research indicate that 97% of organisations
use passwords as a means of authentication[1].
Furthermore, numerous resarchers have concluded
that users do indeed trust these systems. Never-
theless, passwords do have a well documented his-
tory of being insecure. Part of the reason being
user behavior[2, 3, 4], part due to vulnerability
toward social engineering and hacking efforts[5].
Failings in user authentication causes substan-
tial financial loss; in 2007 US$3.2 billion was lost
to phishing [6]. A white paper[7], stipulates that
corporations can reduce cost, by implementing
alternative methods of authentications (Smart-
Cards), due to a decrease in password related sup-
port calls.
These reasons are why the field of user authenti-
cation is important. The consequences of it failing
involve loss of privacy and money. Furthermore,
efficient user authentication can reduce costs.
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2 Theory
Determining if a user is a valid or invalid user of
a system is the art of user authentication. User
authentication is a two step process: First the sys-
tem needs to identify the user, second, that user’s
identity need to be verified. This process can be
conducted using a number of technologies. User
identity is verified using either something the user
knows (such as a password), something she has
(e.g. a key or other token) or something she is (i.e.
fingerprint, voice or other biometric trait). Conse-
quently these groups are often used to categorize
authentication techniques. We will use the terms
knowledge based, possession based and character-
istic based authentication to describe the afore-
mentioned groups.
The central issue related to user authentication
is balancing security with ease of use. One wishes
to maintain high security whilst not making the
process of authentication too cumbersome, stress
inducing or intrusive[3].
2.1 Knowledge based methods of au-
thentication
Knowledge based methods of authentication are
the most common and does indeed enjoy high ac-
ceptance among users[1]. Basically a user’s iden-
tity is successfully verified if she can provide the
secret knowledge linked with her user account such
as a password or pass phrase [8].
Knowledge based systems are, though popular,
only as secure as the secret information they em-
ploy. The key concern is that the chosen secret
must be hard to figure out (by computers or hu-
mans) yet easy enough to remember without re-
sorting to writing the information down or oth-
erwise duplicating it. Key fields relating to pass-
words being researched are password generation,
recall and guessability[2, 9]. Hence extensive re-
search aimed at developing alternatives has been
conducted, as the traditional use of passwords re-
quire a complexity that strains the bounds of hu-
man memory capabilities[10, 11]. Some of these
alternatives are built around the idea of associ-
ation, others around theories relating to human
memory.
A pass phrase is simply a phrase used as a pass-
word (e.g. ”roses are beautiful bananas are slip-
pery”), generally longer then a password. Keith et
al.[10] reasons that an increase of password length
render a greater number of possible combinations
than an increase of the character set used. Their
research also indicates that, even though longer,
pass phrases are no harder to remember then con-
ventional ”strong” passwords. Keith et al. be-
lieves that this is due to aspects of the human
memory described in Millers Chunking Theory.
Associative password systems are, as the name
implies built around the idea of word association.
The user is logged on to a system by supplying
a series of response words corresponding to cues
(e.g. ocean, blue) selected from a template (one
per user)[8]. Zviran and Haga refined this con-
cept when developing cognitive passwords[11]. As
with associative passwords each user has a tem-
plate stored in the system, it contains answers to
a number of fact and opinion based questions e.g.
”What is your mother’s maiden name?” or ”What
is your favorite kind of flower?”. If the user can
answer a subset of these, she is successfully au-
thenticated.
Passwords are usually stored in a database. Lo-
gin is achieved by comparing a user supplied pass-
word to the stored equivalent using the given user
name. A hacking effort is either directed toward a
single user or aimed at gaining access to the entire
database[5, 12]. Many efforts to prevent or mit-
igate the effects of a single stolen password will
impact the security of the database itself. For in-
stance, one of the core security problems retaining
to knowledge based authentication includes pass-
word reuse and password aging[1, 5]. Password
aging occurs when passwords are not changed fre-
quently, allowing an intruder access to a system
for substantial periods of time by way of a re-
covered password. A preventive course of action
taken to combat this is enforcing regular password
changes for all accounts. Such an effort would
mitigate the effects of a compromised database as
well[5]. Studies have shown that this is not com-
mon practice[1], nor user friendly as such a re-
quirement leads to password duplication or users
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resorting to writing down authentication informa-
tion, thereby compromising system integrity[3].
Another noteworthy issue with most authenti-
cation methods is sniffing, i.e when an intruder
obtains a users authentication information as it is
transmitted between user and system. Knowledge
based systems are particularly vulnerable to Van
Eck and keystroke sniffing. A password can be
captured off the screen as it is being displayed by
reading the Van Eck radiation. Keystroke sniffing
is the act of secretly reading keystrokes and cap-
turing information as it is being typed. Van Eck
attacks can be fended off by assuring that pass-
words are not displayed on screen. Keystroke sniff-
ing attacks by assuring that the keyboard memory
buffer can not be read by any software except the
OS. However knowledge based authentication is
very vulnerable against sniffing attacks in general.
Typically passwords are stored and transmitted as
hashes e.g. obscured but such passwords can still
be exploited[12].
One example of such an attack took place in
one of Kinko’s facilities; keystroke-capture soft-
ware were installed on a computer, the software
sent over 450 user names and passwords to an in-
truder that attacked the users bank accounts[5].
All knowledge based authentication approaches
is susceptible to social engineering. Social engi-
neering is the art of manipulating a user to will-
ingly supply authenticating information to a third
party. Often by using trickery or simply asking for
the information, possibly misrepresenting oneself
or ones intent [13].
2.2 Possession based methods of au-
thentication
Possession based authentication methods use
something the user own to verify user identity. An
every day example of this is the way we gain access
to a car. If we have the car key we are believed
to be the rightful owner (or driver) of that car. In
authentication, the item we possess is called the
token. All tokens contain a base secret which is
the equivalent of the secret in knowledge based
authentication systems.
Primarily one differs between passive and active
tokens. Passive tokens does not conceal the base
secret but submits it as it is(e.g. ATM cards).
In contrast active tokens (e.g. SmartCards) have
the capability to process the base secret in some
way and display the result of that process (i.e.
a One-Time password) rather then the base se-
cret itself [12]. SmartCards are active credit-card
sized plastic tokens with a small processor, capa-
ble of encryption. There are active tokens with the
same capabilities as a SmartCard utilizing USB
connectors. The gain of using such tokens is that
USB has become somewhat of a standard inter-
face, hence no additional hardware is required.
Furthermore, USB is faster in comparison to con-
ventional SmartCard readers[14].
Token systems often make use of so called Two-
Factor authentication e.g. one combines sev-
eral authentication methods such as a Magnetic
Card (e.g. ATM card) and PIN code[15]. Other
combinations such as characteristic based meth-
ods in conjunction with SmartCards have been
proposed[16].
The concept of Two-Factor authentication
also applies to Challenge-Response authentication
schemes. Such schemes enable a user to be au-
thenticated without transmitting the actual base
secret. This is achieved by having the server is-
sue a challenge to the user, e.g. enter a number
sent by the server in the token. The token gener-
ates a One-Time password using the issued num-
bers and the base secret (the latter encoded in
the token). The same computation is done server-
side. If the results on both sides match the user is
granted access. The goal of using One-Time pass-
word is to eliminate re-use of a sniffed password,
as such passwords are only valid for a limited time
period[17]. They are becoming increasingly com-
mon in e-commerce and banking[18]. However,
according to Schneier[17] Two-Factor authentica-
tion do not protect against Man-In-The-Middle-
Attack [12] or Trojan attacks. Other sugges-
tions include using SSL/TLS session-aware user
authentication[19] in an effort to prevent the afore-
mentioned Man-In-The-Middle-Attack .
Token Theft can be made more cumbersome by
employing Two-Factor authentication e.g. require
a PIN code before use. Tokens without key pads
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can employ this strategy by requiring the PIN
code prior to, or in conjunction with the token.
2.3 Characteristic based authentica-
tion
All biometric systems are built around the same
principle. Users enroll by suppling a user name
and creating a biometric signature template (i.e.
a template that the system use to authenticate
the user against). When authentication com-
mences the system captures the user’s signature
(e.g. reads her fingerprint) and compares it to the
template. If the user signature matches the tem-
plate to a sufficient degree, the system authenti-
cates the user, otherwise the user is rejected.
Advanced biometric systems combines several
readings when creating the template. This is done
to capture subtle variations between readings [12].
The reason is that template and user signature are
matched through comparison, unlike passwords
the match is never exact. A threshold determines
the degree to which a sample must match the tem-
plate. This fact is the basis for false rejection (of
valid users) and false acceptance (of unauthorized
user) [12]. Different thresholds will result in differ-
ent false acceptance and rejection rates( FAR and
FRR). The optimal threshold would be the value
where the two curves coincide (Equal Error Rate).
However this is seldom the case as the designers
often premiere one over the other[20].
Biometric technologies are often divided into
two sub categories, one being those that are phys-
iological, the other those being behavioral. Much
of the research on the subject indicate that be-
havioral biometrics have higher acceptance among
users then physiological biometrics , but it is un-
der debate[21].
Security threats toward biometrics include Re-
play, By-Passing and Overloading Attacks. All
biometric techniques are potentially vulnerable
against replay attacks, i.e. an intruder replays a
valid biometric signature for the system’s sensor
and is accepted as a genuine signature. A variation
of this type of attack could be enacted utilizing a
forged trait (such as a false thumb)[22]. Forged
traits can be detected by way of a liveness check in
conjunction with reading the sample (e.g. ensur-
ing the presence of a pulse) [8]. Sniffing is an issue
in biometrics as with most methods. Such an at-
tacks can be made more costly for an intruder. For
instance, the system could alternate the trait used
for authentication, hence forcing an intruder to
intercept a multitude of biometric readings. An-
other approach is encrypting the biometric signa-
ture as it is transmitted. This would require the
use of encryption keys, which might diminish the
benefits of a biometric system. Furthermore one
can employ authentication techniques in order as-
sure that the reader itself is trusted. This is useful
in distributed environments[12].
A By-pass attack aims at circumventing the en-
tire biometric authentication mechanism (i.e. by-
passing it). This is achieved by compromising the
trait, making it hard for the system to obtain a
good enough template. The desired effect is to
be switched to an alternative, less secure authen-
tication system. This attack relates to an (as of
yet) inherent problem relating to biometrics: The
persistent nature of biometric traits. I.e. a bio-
metric trait cannot be changed nor replaced if
compromised or otherwise unsuitable(e.g. sniffed,
copied or damaged by injury)[23], however, IBM
is working on developing Cancellable Biometrics
[22]. Furthermore Lee[22] mentions overloading
attacks; i.e. to weaken or circumvent the authenti-
cation method by overloading the biometric reader
itself resulting in diminished security.
2.4 Use and awareness of Two-Factor
authentication
Two-Factor authentication methods such as
SmartCards are being used more and more. Re-
searchers have seen an increase in use, for in-
stance Forrester Research forecasted that in Eu-
rope alone, over 130 million people will be using
remote e-banking services by 2007, up 75 million
compared to 2005[15]. According to RSA CSO
perspective survey , 25% of respondants use Two-
Factor authentication (with SmartCards) moder-
atly in their cooperation, 8% use it universally.
Approximatly 11% employ SmartCards alone for
authentication purposes moderatly in their organi-
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zation while 4% use the solution universally within
their organisation[24]. A pilot study in England
investigating the use of Two-Factor authentication
at the point of sale (as a replacement of signatures)
showed that 83% of the customers was positive
about the launch of such a system[25].
Granted the these studies differ in contexts,
some not directly relevant to this paper. How-
ever, the results above could indicate the status
quo regarding possession/ Two-Factor authentica-
tion methods.
A survey testing the security and usability of
three Two-Factor authentication solutions utiliz-
ing active tokens in e-banking, showed that users
preferred a simple token generating a One-Time
password, over an alternative using a Challenge-
Response scheme in conjunction with a PIN Code.
The reason being that the latter was more time
consuming to use and harder to learn [18].
2.5 Attitudes toward biometrics
Deane et al.[21] found behavioral biometrics tech-
nologies had lower acceptability then physiologi-
cal alternatives. Out of the physiological biomet-
rics technologies included in their survey finger-
print and hand geometry were the only technolo-
gies found acceptable(based on a mean acceptabil-
ity rating among respondents). Among the gener-
ally lesser accepted behavioral biometrics methods
only voice recognition was considered acceptable.
The high acceptance of fingerprint use is strength-
ened by other research as well: In a study by Mag-
nusson and Giarimi[26] 95% of those positive to-
wards use of biometrics preferred fingerprints, 44%
preferred voice biometrics. Further indications of
fingerprint being the trait of choice is found in
Furnell et al’s. survey from 2005 where fingerprint
had the highest preference next to passwords[1].
Another interesting observation made by Dean
et al. is that as the perceived sensitivity of in-
formation increases so does the perceived accept-
ability of some biometric authentication meth-
ods (specifically keystroke verification and finger-
print recognition). This increase might help jus-
tify the fact that both keystroke analysis and
mouse dynamics was ascribed high acceptance
when used for continuous authentication by other
researchers[1]. (Note however that Dean et al. do
not differ between continuous and ”at log in” au-
thentication in their survey.)
Retina scanning was classified as unacceptable
in Dean et al.’s survey based on mean values, how-
ever, in percentages 49 % considered the method
unacceptable[21]. Assuming that the remainder
concidered the technology acceptable to some de-
gree, it is in the same range of acceptance as iris
scanning had in Furnell et al.’s study[1] (47% when
used for initial login), and 44% in Magnusson et
al’s study (when applied on mobile phones)[26].
Indeed, these results are not comparable, some
pertain to the context of mobile phones. Fur-
thermore Dean et al. measured acceptance of
retina scanning as opposed to iris scans. How-
ever, the fact that the results are in the same range
could indicate the general acceptance level of both
these methods. Such reasoning is strengthened by
the fact that a later survey by Furnell et al.[4]
show similar results regarding acceptance of iris
scanning as a authentication method (for mobile
phones).
Both Dean et al. and Furnell et al. acknowledge
trust, and specifically Work Performance Moni-
toring, as important factors in achieving accep-
tance of biometric authentication methods. User
awareness of the policies surrounding monitor-
ing is crucial in order to successfully launch such
systems[21, 23], a fact that resonates in Furnell et
al. survey result where in excess of 80% states the
importance of user awareness. A survey showed
that 40% of participants would consider moni-
toring an invasion of privacy, 45% felt that they
would not trust their organization to use collected
information soley for security purpouses [1]. Dean
et al. speculate that the fear of WPM might par-
tially explain behavioral biometrics methods lesser
acceptance in their study[21].
Another facet of trust central to biometric au-
thentication is privacy: Research indicate that
there is a a remarkable difference in acceptance de-
pending on where the biometric template is stored.
In cases where the user is the only one having
access to the biometric template the positive re-
sponses ranged from 72% to 83%[26] while lesser
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when others had access. This preference is evident
in another suvey where 50% prefered local stor-
age of biometric templates(34% prefered network
storage)[4]. Bernecker[23], along with others[16],
promote storing of the template (i.e. the secret)
using a SmartCard carried by the user as the per-
manent housing of the template. Such a solution
would also conform with the principle of keeping
information stored on the authentication site to a
minimum[27].
2.6 Dual relationship between memory
and password security
As stated in 2.1, passwords need to be com-
plex enough to withstand cracking attempts, and
changed regularly in order to prevent password ag-
ing. Guidelines and recommendations aimed at
achieving this, is however largely ignored due to
the resulting effects on memorability. Results from
one study indicated that 70% of participents could
not remember a password they had created a week
earlier[28]. Bersch found that only 35% could re-
call a non-assigned password after three months
(23% when the password was assigned)[2]. The
tendency to forget passwords is indicated further
by fact that results from a 2004 survey showed par-
ticipants forgot their passwords between one and
two times every month depending on the number
of passwords used by the respondent[9].
The poor recollection of passwords is un-
derstandable when considering that most peo-
ple use multiple password protected systems
concurrently[2, 1, 4]. Researchers have found that
the use of multiple password protected systems
lead to password duplication. A survey showed
that only 7,1% of the participants used a unique
password on each system. The survey also showed
that 65,1% of all services shared a password[2].
Apart from duplication, users tend to forego
regular password changes: Furnell et al. found
that a mere 28% changed passwords monthly or
more often (the remainder doing so twice a year
18%, more seldom 20% or never 34%)[1]; A survey
on mobile phone practices reveal even more com-
pelling results as a total of 13% reported changing
their PIN code monthly or yearly, 45% never did
it (remainder changed pin at purchase)[4]; Brown
et al’s survey showed that 11,9% of respondents
where forced to change their passwords[2].
Ignoring password aging and duplicating pass-
words to this extent exposes the users to the so
called domino effect, where an intruder by way of
one recovered password could access several other
systems, e.g. compromising several systems[5].
If an entire database of authentication were to
be compromised, the effects could be devastating.
However, solutions such as the one proposed by
Szydlo et al.[29] aim to make such an attempt
more cumbersome by incorporating two or more
servers in the authentication process. As afore-
mentioned (in 2.1) tools, such as keyloggers can be
used to ultimately exploit the domino effect in a
password system. Online fraud do indeed result in
substantial loss: In March 2007 APACS released
statistics revealing that on-line banking frauds was
increasing in the UK, in 2005 it was a £23.2 mil-
lion issue; the following year the amount was £33.5
million[15]. Bruce Schneider[17] reasons the use of
Challenge-Response and One-Time passwords do
mitigate the effects of sniffing attacks and com-
promised databases. However Schneier also ob-
serves that Man-In-The-Middle-Attack nor Trojan
attacks would be impeded.
There is a dual relationship between ease of
use and security of a system recognised by sev-
eral authors[3, 1]. As they imply that the use of
stronger passwords and polices (regarding pass-
word change etc.) may compromise simplicity of
use. When passwords become complex, along with
the use password changing policies, users resort
to other harmful behavior such as writing pass-
words down, along with further password duplica-
tion. One user was cited saying ”...because I was
forced into changing it every month I had to write
it down.”, a practice adopted by 50% of asked
users[3]. Other researchers have found evidence
supporting this prevalence: A 2004 survey showed
that 27% of participants admitted to writing down
their passwords[9]; Dhamija et al. found that a
vast majority of participants wrote down all or a
subset of their passwords[28]; Bunnel et al. that in
excess of 40% admitted to writing down thier pass-
word in order to remember it (an assigned pass-
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word), one fifth when memorising a self-generated
password as well[30].
Knowledge based authentication methods de-
veloped in an effort to lessen the memory strain
inherent with strong passwords include the Pass
phrase, associative and cognitive passwords. Key
when evaluating these methods is recall and guess-
ability rates.
Zviran and Haga are two prominent researchers
advocating cognitive passwords. Their stud-
ies of recall and guessability showed that fact
based questions was easier to recall then opin-
ion based[11], average recall rates after 3 month
among respondents was about 78% (fact based
88,3%, opinion based 74%). Later the same year
the authors published another study with simi-
lar results [31]: average recall rates after 3 month
among respondents was about 83% (fact based
94%, opinion based 88%). In both studies Re-
call rates where significantly better compared to
convensional passwords. Their 1993 study[32] re-
vealed somewhat lower recall rates (an all over
average of 68%, 83,7% fact based, 70% opinion
based).
Bunnell et al.[30] raises concerns about Zviran
and Hagas 1993 study[32], criticizing the exten-
sive timespan and the testing of multiple pass-
word knowledge based alternatives. Furthermore
they note that Zviran and Haga did not investi-
gate guessability. Bunnell et al. study mimics that
of Zviran and Haga, but use a shorter timespan, a
larger set of cognitive questions, and they generate
cue words (asking participants to generate only re-
sponse words). Their results are very similar with
88% recollection of the fact based items and 72% of
opinion based. Their investigation of guessability
reveals that 56% of fact based and 23% of opinion
based items where guessed by significant others.
Associative password recollection results dif-
fer significantly between the researchers studies
69%[32] versus 39%[30]). Bunnell et al. reason
that their poor results might be attributed to the
fact that they chose to use cue words that where
known to produce heterogeneous responses in an
effort to reduce guessability (which was indeed
low). This fact might have impacted memorability
in a negative way[30].
Research indicates that even though longer,
pass phrases are no harder to remember then con-
ventional strong passwords. Nevertheless, pass
phrases are more prone to typing errors then (both
strong and simple) passwords[10, 11].
All varieties of knowledge based authentication
are highly susceptible to social engineering. A
survey was conducted on the streets of London,
people passing by was asked for the password to
their computer. In the end 75% of them revealed
their password to the researchers[33]. Furnell et al.
found that 29% admitted that they have shared
their password with coworkers, 21% admitted that
they have used someone elses password without
their consent[1]. Another study concluded that in
working environments, people are liable to share
their account information in order to better facili-
tate working together on group tasks[3]. Granted
this kind of behavior does not directly relate to
Social Engineering , nevertheless it does indicate
that users handle their account information in a
manner considered insecure.
3 Research Method
Figure 1: Overview of knowledge flow in the re-
search process
The research method (see Figure 1) is based on
the principles of Design Research as described by
Takeda et al.[34].
The problem observed by the customer is vali-
dated by a short literature study, aimed at find-
ing documented support for the perceived flaws in
knowledge based authentication. This activity re-
sult in an Awareness of the problem and a research
proposal, including a Suggestion on improving the
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problem. The research proposal also specifies re-
strictions and scope of the suggested solution (see
3.1.1)
Architecture development is done in an ex-
ploratory manner by way of prototyping (de-
scribed in 3.1). A process that generates a deeper
Awareness of the problem, while allowing refine-
ment of the Suggestion itself. The final outcome
of prototyping process is an architecture (4) and
a partial implementation of the same.
After development, a more comprehensive liter-
ature study (3.2), extending the initial background
research is conducted (section 2). Findings from
this effort is used as a framework in Evaluation of
the Suggestion.
Evaluation is done by observing what deficien-
cies, in knowledge based authentication the archi-
tecture can mitigate or counter. Evaluation also
includes discussing risks introduced by and pos-
sible improvements of, the architecture (i.e. the
Suggestion).
Finally, the Conclusions from the Evaluation is
accounted for, summing up pros and cons of the
architecture, in conjunction with suggesting suit-
able areas of further research.
3.1 Prototyping
Evolutionary prototyping is well suited for devel-
oping systems where the requirements are vague
and dynamic[35]. Prototype development is con-
ducted in short, iterative, development cycles in
close contact with the customer followed by cus-
tomer meetings regarding updates and/ or require-
ments issues. Requirements are derived and re-
fined through semi-structured interviews with the
customer. In addition informal use cases and se-
quence diagrams are tools used, both during the
requirements engineering process (with customer)
and for documentation.
3.1.1 Scope of prototype
A company working with secure email applica-
tions wanted a prototype for a possession based
authentication system, replacing the traditional
password system default in Windows XP. The pur-
pose was primarily to investigate feasibility and
potential security issues countered or introduced
by such a solution.
The prototype was to address local login i.e. not
addressing remote login scenarios. Architecture is
limited to using standard USB storage devices as
tokens (i.e. not active tokens).
3.2 Literature study
The primary literature sources are various journal
articles found through digital libraries. In addi-
tion, select books found through Chalmers Univer-
sity Library Databases or electronic libraries such
as Books24x7 are included. Binary search strings
such as ”User authentication” or ”Biometrics” are
used when searching for material.
A collection of articles were selected based on
title and abstract relevance. A subset of these
were selected for a full text review. References
deemed relevant were then examined in the same
manner.
The literature used is published in 1989 or later.
The reason for this is twofold: First literature pre
1989 on relevant technologies tend to be some-
what out of date (e.g. the technological environ-
ment changes). Second, focusing on newer sources
(dated 1990 or later) results in a more current view
of the acceptance concerning the different methods
of authentication.
4 Result
4.1 Purpose of Prototype
A company working with secure email applica-
tions wanted a prototype for a possession based
authentication system, replacing the traditional
password system default in Windows XP. The pur-
pose was primarily to investigate feasibility and
explore potential fall pits involved in developing
such a system.
Scope of prototype The prototype was to be
limited to local login i.e. not addressing remote
login of any kind. The prototype was to use stan-
dard USB storage devices, not active token tech-
nologies.
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Figure 2: High level illustration of the prototype
architecture.
4.2 Architecture description
The architecture (Fig.2) consists of five major
components (each of which is described below).
The data holding components are the UsbToken
and the ComputerDB, the other are three soft-
ware components; the GUI.exe, Common.dll and
Gina.dll. These three will be described only in
terms of required functionality, specific function
names or equivalent are not specified. The illus-
tration includes suggested programming languages
for each component. These are best viewed sug-
gestions and nothing else.
4.2.1 ComputerDB
ComputerDB is the database containing informa-
tion about all users registered in the system (i.e.
stored on the computer). In our implementation
we used an XML file for storage. The attributes
in the database are:
UsbId is a unique value identifying a USB de-
vice (used as token). The UsbId attribute is used
to facilitate the destruction of lost tokens. This
value is needed in order to determined what user
account (i.e. user registered in the ComputerDB)
a UsbToken is assigned to. When the system is
supplied a UsbToken the UsbId from that token is
read. The value is used to search the ComputerDB
for the matching UsbId value.
1
2KEY is one half of an encryption key, the
other half resides on the UsbToken. When as-
sembled the complete key is used to decrypt the
Username and UserPassword attributes on the Us-
bToken. Provided the system achieved a positive
match between UsbId attributes (i.e. in Compu-
terDB and UsbToken), the two 12KEY attributes
are fetched and assembled.
Username is needed when deleting keys from
the database. It is stored unencrypted. Not in-
cluding the (unencrypted) Username in Comput-
erDB would mean not being able to know what
accounts have been assigned a UsbToken without
being in possession of the token.
Domain identifies the domain name of the com-
puter protected by the system. This information
is needed at login in Windows XP if the computer
belongs to a domain.
4.2.2 UsbToken
The UsbToken is a USB storage device used as
a user’s token. The information about a user’s
account (detailed below) is stored in a file (An
XML file in the prototype implementation). That
file is called the key file. Observe that each key
file contains information about exactly one user
account. The attributes stored in a key file are:
UsbId is matched to the matching attribute in
the ComputerDB in order to assert what user ac-
count the UsbToken is registered to. In other
words, the UsbId is a unique value used to iden-
tify a specific UsbToken. The attribute’s use is
two fold: One, it facilitates the encryption of User-
name and UserPassword attributes stored on the
UsbToken. Two, it is a preventive measure meant
to make the task of copying a UsbToken more dif-
ficult. Ideally this value is not be stored in the
key file, but rather calculated using information
about the UsbToken and the key file, the result
stored in the ComputerDB at the time of key cre-
ation. Then, the UsbId could be calculated and
matched with the UsbId attribute stored in Com-
puterDB at each login. Regardless, Fig.2 depicts
UsbId as an attribute of UsbToken because it is
considered to be an attribute of a UsbToken.
1
2KEY is one half of the encryption key used
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to decrypt the Username and UserPassword at-
tributes stored in the key file. The other half
resides in the ComputerDB. When a token key
has been inserted and a positive match of UsbId
attributes have been achieved (between Compu-
terDB and the UsbToken), the 12KEY attributes
are assembled forming a complete key used to de-
crypt the Username and UserPassword
Username is the encrypted username of the user
issued the UsbToken.
UserPassword is the encrypted user password.
4.2.3 Gina.dll
Gina.dll is a part of the Windows XP OS that
handles the login procedure in Windows XP. Ba-
sically it is the program that shows up when the
user is asked to authenticate herself to the Op-
erating System (OS). The program dictates the
authentication procedure as it is perceived by the
users. Since we are re writing this procedure, this
file is overwritten.
The Gina.dll in the architecture determines
how, and from where, the data used when authen-
ticating a user is collected, and how it is manip-
ulated. E.g. Gina.dll dictates that the username
and password for an account is to be fetched from
a UsbToken, and decrypted using the 12KEY at-
tributes from the UsbToken and the entry in the
ComputerDB matching the UsbId found on the
UsbToken.
Gina.dll use functions found in the library Com-
mon.dll for reading data from ComputerDB and
UsbToken, as well as decrypting information on
the UsbToken.
A basic high level use case scenario of a suc-
cessful login by the prototype is described below,
actors involved are the System (meaning our pro-
totype) and the User (meaning the user wanting
access):
1. The System asks for a UsbToken
2. The User inserts a UsbToken
3. The System gets the UsbId from UsbToken
4. The System finds the corresponding UsbId in
ComputerDB
5. The System assembles the encryption key us-
ing 12KEY attributes from both ComputerDB
and UsbToken
6. The System uses the assembled encryption
key to decrypt Username and UserPassword
on UsbToken
7. The System attempts to login using the de-
crypted Username and UserPassword
8. The System evaluates result of attempt
9. The User is successfully authenticated and
granted access to The System
4.2.4 Common.dll
The library Common.dll provides functionality
for reading and writing information to and from
both UsbToken and ComputerDB. Furthermore it
provides functions for encrypting and decrypting
Username and UserPassword attributes. Com-
mon.dll is used by both GUI.exe and Gina.dll,
hence the name Common.dll.
4.2.5 GUI.exe
GUI.exe is the desktop application used for creat-
ing, changing, deleting keys for existing accounts
in Windows. It has functionality for creating, re-
placing and deleting UsbToken for Windows XP
user accounts, and can only be used by Adminis-
trators. It uses Common.dll when reading, writ-
ing, encrypting and decrypting data from Compu-
terDB and UsbToken.
5 Discussion
The literature study revealed strong indications of
human memory limitations being a contributing
factor to insecure password systems. The multi-
tude of systems utilizing knowledge based authen-
tication used by users lead to memory strain and
in turn the adoption of bad password practices.
The vulnerability toward social engineering inher-
ent in all knowledge based systems are another
contributing factor to these systems insecurity (as
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described in 2.6). Ergo, the potential gain of using
a non knowledge based alternative is apparent.
In an architecture such as the one proposed
(see 4), the secret (i.e. password) is stored on
the token. Therefore, users need not remember it.
Thereby permitting an increased password length
and complexity without adding strain to a users
memory. Password complexity could be guaran-
teed if the an implementation of such an archi-
tecture could generate passwords for users at en-
rollment (i.e. assign passwords to existing user
accounts). Prevention of password aging can be
facilitated by having the system re-generate pass-
words for user accounts periodically. However,
such features are beyond the scope of the imple-
mented prototype.
Of course, memory strain would become a non
issue if using a characteristic based authentication
solution. Several biometric technologies do indeed
have acceptable user acceptance rates according to
surveys. However one might argue that biometrics
are not suitable because:
All secrets can be compromised or stolen, this
includes all three groups of authentication meth-
ods mentioned here. One common denominator
of knowledge and possession based authentication
is the non-persistent nature of the secret(s): If
lost or stolen the secret is easily changed, whereas
a biometric template or sample is not. Further-
more, a compromised password or biometric sam-
ple might go undetected until an intruder causes
damage. A token often used on the other hand, is
more likely to be missed. In addition, a biometric
templates persistent nature makes it highly desir-
able to intruders, hence secure storage is of the
essence. During development we found that se-
cure storage most often raises the question of how
to encrypt sensitive information and subsequent
questions regarding where to hide the encryption
key (the so called hide the key problem). In order
to circumvent this problem, the proposed architec-
ture splits the encryption key and stores it in to
separate locations (see section 4). This effectively
lessens the amount of sensitive information stored
in one location.
To mitigate the effects of a lost token, the ar-
chitecture of our solution is designed in such a
way that no information identifying the computer
hosting the account is stored on the token. How-
ever, one issue introduced by our solution (due to
the use of a storage device as token) is the risk of
users storing content revealing the location, name
or similar of the computer on the token. (Or us-
ing a USB device with a company logo, address
or similar as token). Another issue linked to to-
ken loss/theft is the risk of the token being copied.
If obtained, the key file(4.2.2) can be copied and
used to make a working duplicate. Our prototype
use a generated value as UsbId. Never the less,
as is stated in 4.2.2, calculating a value using the
data from the USB device itself and the key file
stored on it would be preferred. It would provide
a way of assuring that the provided USB device is
the one used when creating the UsbToken without
storing the value on the device. Hence, making key
duplication more cumbersome.
One flaw we have observed in our architecture
is that we store the user names of accounts issued
a key. This is a duplication of somewhat sensitive
information. What motivates the duplication is
that without access to this information, it would
be impossible to know what users have been is-
sued a key without being in possession of it. Such
a limitation would make replacing lost keys very
difficult.
The very purpose of our solution was to not in-
crease the number of passwords or equal imposed
on a user, hence we opted not to employ Two-
Factor authentication (i.e. PIN and token). Of
course the degree of confidence in the identity of
the token holder lessens because of this choice.
However an area of future research would be to
investigate the use of ones fingerprint for Two-
Factor authentication. Besides effectively tying
the user to a token, a fingerprint could be used
to encrypt account information on the token. If
the biometric template is stored on the token, the
user would be the only one holding the token. Ac-
cording to our findings in literature, this kind of
storage is preferred by users.
One of the major insecurities of knowledge
based authentication methods is Social Engineer-
ing. Several scholars have investigated guessabil-
ity rates of such methods. We perceive another
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risk, not relating to guessability, that has not been
mentioned in any of the literature we have studied:
In todays society where most information about a
person’s past is publicly available (e.g. on the In-
ternet), acquiring the information most likely used
as answers in for instance a cognitive password
system, is probably not that difficult a task. Us-
ing an alternative method of authentication such
as biometrics or tokens would, if our assumption
above has any merit, increase security.
6 Conclusion
Our findings show that knowledge based authen-
tication is despite its documented flaws, the most
used and popular method of authentication.
The solution we have proposed eliminates the
need to remember passwords for user accounts.
(Not including the administrator account, which
is needed when creating and replacing tokens, i.e.
only one password per machine is required.)
Not having to remember passwords leads to
fewer restrictions when generating passwords.
Hence permitting an increased complexity and
length, thus increasing security. Aging of these
passwords can be prevented by having the system
regenerate account passwords for users during ac-
tive sessions, therefore evading what is known as
the domino effect.
Token loss is mitigated by the fact the token
does not contain any information identifying the
computer it is used with. However we would like
to stress that policies instructing users not to store
such information on the token is needed.
Our assessment is that the only sensitive infor-
mation possible to obtain from a stolen token is
the UsbId and the 12KEY attributes. It is recog-
nised that the 12 KEY could be used in an attempt
to brute force a complete encryption key used to
decrypt account information resident on the to-
ken. Any calculations on the magnitude of such
an effort has not been attempted by us as it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Furthermore, as described in both 4.2.2 and 5,
storing the UsbId attribute on the token makes it
possible to produce a duplicate. Calculating such
a value at each login would make duplication more
cumbersome. This has not been implemented in
our prototype.
Lastly we feel that user acceptance of posses-
sion based authentication technologies when used
in personal computers is a research area in need
of renewal. A great deal of the published material
on possession based authentication that we found
was either related to corporate/e-commerce appli-
cations or out of date.
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